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| Psychology of Communication: personality |
It is noted that the authoritarian personality theory of Adorno et al is now seldom referred to in race relations research and that the scale used to operationalize the theory (the F scale) is a very poor measure of what it purports to measure (Right-wing authoritarianism). The F scale does have many correlates, however, and the work of Pflaum is referred to support the contention that the F scale in fact taps an old-fashioned orientation. A large correlational study by Kline & Cooper is reinterpreted in this light and it is shown that when pejorative assumptions are discarded, the old-fashioned person would appear to have many potentially admirable characteristics. The new understanding of what the F scale measures is also shown to be helpful in making sense of the findings from many other studies.
Although devised as a means of explaining racism, the authoritarian personality theory of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford (1950) is now little used for that purpose. Current research into race relations or intergroup relations tends to give it at best token mention (e.g. Doise, 1985; Cobas, 1986; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Messick & Mackie, 1989). This seems to be because group loyalty is now generally seen as a universal human attribute rather than as an attribute of deviants only. In the words of one elementary textbook writer, ethnocentrism and stereotyping are "universal ineradicable psychological processes" (Brown, 1986. See also Tajfel & Fraser, 1978). Another reason for disregarding the Adorno et al work is that its chief measuring instrument (the F scale) and key to the theory has been repeatedly shown as invalid. It does not predict authoritarian behavior (Titus & Hollander, 1957; Titus, 1968; Altemeyer, 1981; Ray & Lovejoy, 1983) and it is a poor predictor of political Rightism. In general population samples, many Leftist voters get high scores on it (Hanson, 1975; Ray, 1973b, 1983c, 1984 & 1985a).
Although this is a considerable record of failure, it only tells part of the story. The other side is of course the fact that vast numbers of articles have been published wherein the F scale has been shown to have significant relationships with other variables. The F scale may not measure what it purports to measure but it does measure something that seems to have an effect on many other variables. But what could this be? If the scale does not measure what it was devised to measure, is it likely that it adventitiously measures something else? If it does not measure authoritarianism or political conservatism, what could it measure that would produce the relationships observed?
We do of course have Gabennesch's (1972) suggestion that a high F score represents narrowness of world-view and a narrow breadth of perspective but this would seem to come rather close to equating authoritarianism with lack of education and the correlations between F scale score and education are not generally high and have even been on some occasions non-significant (See Table 1 in Ray, 1983a and also the -.047 correlation discussed under a later heading in this paper). There may therefore be some tendency for F scale scorers to be as Gabennesch characterizes them but that is surely not the whole of what the F scale measures.
Aside from the Gabennesch work, however, no systematic investigation of alternatives to authoritarianism as an explanation of what the F scale measures appears to have been so far attempted in the literature (though I have mentioned in passing the proposal to be explored here on a number of previous occasions. See e.g. Ray, 1983c, 1987 and 1988), but there is fortunately on record one finding that gives a very strong clue about what the answer might be. Pflaum (1964) showed that a parallel form of the 'F' scale could be produced from collections of myths and superstitions that had been popular in the 1920's. Now this is very strong data indeed. If Pflaum had simply shown that the 'F' scale correlated with assent to popular myths and superstitions of the past, that could simply be written off as just another interesting finding of uncertain implication. The correlations Pflaum found, however, were so high that they enabled claims that a parallel form of the 'F' scale had been found. Pflaum has therefore made an explicit discovery about what the F scale consists of. It is a collection of old-fashioned myths and superstitions or statements that strongly resemble them. Hartmann (1977) described the 'F' scale as a collection of "Victorian" values (no doubt Biedemeyer values in the German case) so the culture that produced 'F' scale type sentiments may go back even earlier than the 1920's. At any event, it is clear that the attitudes expressed in the 'F' scale were old-fashioned even when the 'F' scale was compiled. How much more old-fashioned they must be today! That they are is also shown by the fact that the F scale always seems to correlate with age (e.g. Meloen, Hagendoorn, Raaijmakers & Visser, 1988). Older people tend to get higher scores on it.
Another piece of work which supports this interpretation of the F scale is the finding by Alwin (1988) to the effect that the ideals for child behavior in the U.S.A. have changed a lot since the 1920's. In the 20's conformity and obedience to authority were what was expected of children. In present times, however, this is replaced by values directed toward the child being more autonomous. So what do we find in the F scale? About a third of the items stress the importance of authority in general and several specifically advocate obedience to authority by young people -- exactly what we would expect of a scale embodying 1920's values. Putting it another way, the pro-authority content of the F scale is an important part of its "old-fashionedness". Koomen (1972) has also documented (for both Germany and the United States) the authoritarian nature of child-rearing practices in the 1920's and 1930's.
In short, a high 'F' scorer is not a Fascist but rather someone who is still lost in the culture of the pre-war era. He or she tends to be "old-fashioned". Since Hitler's Nazism did strongly tend to romanticize the past and perhaps took some of its values from the past, some understanding of how the two variables got mixed up would seem possible. Adorno et al heard various expressions of attitude from various sources in California that sounded to them like what they had heard from Hitler. They mistakenly assumed that the old-fashioned people who uttered these statements must also be like Hitler. They did, of course attempt to substantiate their suspicions empirically but their methods for doing so have long ago been shown as prejudging the question (Christie & Jahoda, 1954; McKinney, 1973; Ray, 1973a). In other words, the "authoritarian" was essentially a case of mistaken identity -- unless, of course, someone wishes to propose that all old- fashioned people are Nazis.
Surely, however, no-one would propose that all old-fashioned people are Nazis. Nor is it clear, in fact, that the Nazis were old- fashioned. They may have romanticized the past but their military doctrine and technology, for instance, were very advanced for the times -- as their several years of initial military success showed (Dupuy, 1986). In the non-military sphere, too, many Nazi preoccupations seem even today to be startlingly modern -- beliefs in whole-grain bread, holistic medicine, ecology etc. (Proctor, 1988). Proctor (1988) also points out that even Nazi ideas of racial hygiene were and are essentially "normal" science in the Kuhnian sense. Nazism and being old-fashioned are, then, clearly far from being one and the same. What being old-fashioned implies, then, must be studied in its own right.
[mail to John Ray]
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