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This section refers to three possible examples of agenda setting:
One particularly well-known example of the media apparently setting the agenda is media attention to a speech delivered by Enoch Powell MP in 1968. The speech was delivered to a small audience in a church hall. In it Powell drew attention to what he considered to be the dangers of immigration. He foresaw a time when British streets would 'foam with blood like the Tiber'. Since then the speech has been referred to commonly as his 'rivers of blood speech'. The speech was delivered at a time when the Race Relations Bill was being debated in parliament.
What is particularly significant is that the media chose to focus great attention on the speech. Within two days 86% of the population knew of the speech:
Before the speech only 6% of a Gallup poll sample thought immigration was an issue of national importance. Afterwards 27% thought it was important, and nearly 70% of the public thought that the government would have to take a 'harder line'. .... In effect .... Powell had won himself a national constituency, a platform in the media from which to state his views on most subjects with the certainty of having an audience.
(Curran and Seaton (1981)
Golding and Deacon: The 'Poll Tax'
Golding and Deacon of Loughborough University followed closely the massive public relations exercise which the government was involved in to persuade the public to accept the Community Charge (commonly known as the 'Poll Tax'). (Golding and Deacon (1991)) Their report on their research pays considerable attention to the structure of the media in Britain and to the PR methods used by the government. It makes interesting reading, but we won't deal with that here, as it's more appropriate to our section on political propaganda.
Their article also reports their examination of links between media attention to the Poll Tax and public perception of it as a major issue. The graph below is an attempt to show Deacon's and Golding's results in graphical form:
The coloured lines show the public's perception of the relative importance of national issues. That is plotted as a percentage of the respondents surveyed.
The black line shows the extent of media attention to the Community Charge. It is plotted as a percentage of a possible 800 articles per month.
Since the units obviously don't match the vertical axis is left blank.
Deacon and Golding suggest that the close correlation between media coverage of the Poll Tax and public perception of its importance are suggestive of agenda-setting by the media. On the other hand, it's worth pointing out that public perception of other issues is not all that far from the media line on the graph for much of the period covered. It may also be of some significance that there research focused on newspaper coverage. It's known that during the Gulf War, for instance, some 65% of the adult population used TV as their prime source of news about the war. So maybe we need to examine TV coverage as well before we can reach any firm conclusions.
However, what is interesting about their results is that media attention to the Poll Tax fell fairly abruptly after April 1990 when the tax was first introduced. That was the first month that people actually had to fork out the money, so it would be reasonable to expect that it would be perceived by most of the public as an even more important issue. In fact, it fell, in line with media attention.
Larry Agran
Joshua Meyrowitz (1995 in Kendall (1995)) relates what is to me the extraordinary story of presidential hopeful, Larry Agran. Maybe if I lived in a country which elects a president, I wouldn't find it quite so odd that I have never heard of a candidate who, by all accounts, was well received by the public when he had the opportunity to address them.
In his account of the way the media handled Agran's campaign, Meyrowitz distinguishes three 'logics':
Public vs. media logic
Essentially, the 'public logic' differs from 'media logic' in that the public is concerned to answer the question 'who will govern best?' and the media are concerned to answer the question 'who will win?'. Journalists' concentration on the 'who will win?' question no doubt derives from a combination of Galtung's and Ruge's news values of 'unambiguity' and 'personalization'. It is difficult to create an unambiguous 'story' out of political issues, which necessarily have many shades of gray; personalization, reducing the presidential primaries to a fight between a couple of heavyweight contenders, aids unambiguity.
Local vs. national logic
The differences between the local and national media 'logics' derive from the fact that the local media are apparently more willing to devote attention to a wider range of candidates, since all candidates are on 'their patch' (in this case, New Hamsphire, where the first primary takes place). Thus, lesser known candidates have a better chance of reaching what Galtung and Ruge refer to as the 'threshold' for exposure in local media than they do in the national media. Already in that distinction between local and national media, we see a significant difference in emphasis between local and national journalists's perceptions of news values and these differences in perception are elaborated throughout Meyrowitz's investigation through his reports of his conversations with a range of campaign workers, journalists and members of the public.
At the outset, Meyrowitz identifies Agran's lack of media exposure as being what prevented him from obtaining media exposure. He was repeatedly referred to throughout the campaign (if at all) as an 'outside contender', a 'dark horse' and so on. Since he was never presented by the mainstream national media as a serious contender for the candidacy, he was unable to achieve the airtime on TV or radio debates, which might have enabled him to be seen as a serious contender. This is an example of the circularity implicit in Galtung's and Ruge's news value of 'reference to élite persons'. Certain persons, by virtue of the position they occupy, qualify as élite persons. Thus certain candidates were guaranteed some media exposure, for a while at least, from the very beginning of the campaign by virtue of holding élite posts as state governors, senators etc. Agran was the mayor of a small town. Apart from those in élite posts, the media pay attention to anyone who is important, but, of course, anyone who is important is in the news. Catch-22: if you're not in the news, you're not important, so you don't get into the news.
What is particularly interesting is the continued failure of Agran's campaign to gain any significant media attention even after four of the candidates had withdrawn from the Democratic field. Agran achieved more new York votes to be placed on the ballot than Jerry Brown, but only Jerry Brown was permitted to speak in New York City's public debates with Bill Clinton. At one point, Agran stood up and spoke from the floor of a debate on urban problems, his speciality, stating 'I respectfully ask to be included in this forum'. he was promptly wrestled to the ground, dragged outside and arrested. Even his arrest fuelled little media interest. Even the fact that he remained under threat of imprisonment as a result of this incident for the following ten months and his repeated attempts to focus attention on the implications of that for an open society generated little attention. Meyrowitz's research suggests that a variety of factors contribute to the disregard of Agran's campaign:
At both local and national level, journalists complained about a lack of resources. With insufficient resources to cover all candidates, there must inevitably be a focus on just a few of them. This refers not just to a lack of technology, but also to recent reductions in staff numbers as well as to a decrease in the amount of space available for news, as declining revenues had pushed up the proportion of advertizing. In addition, national news media are faced with paying travel expenses and hotel bills for all of their staff, so are only too happy to see the number of candidates narrowed down, as they then need to have fewer staff in the field. This accounts for the fact that Agran did not, in the national media, 'replace' those candidates who dropped out. This latter factor also explains in part the continued broader coverage by local media, which do not have to cover such expenses. Where television is concerned, airtime itself is a scarce resource. The ratings have to be kept high to keep the advertisers happy, so a televised debate is likely to be personalized as a fairly brief encounter between two political personalities rather than as a wide-ranging discussion of major political issues.
However, as Meyrowitz says, scarce resources cannot in themselves account for the continued lack of attention to Agran after the point where only he, Brown and Clinton remained in the race. Here the major factor which comes into play seems to be the journalists' assessment of who has a realistic chance of winning. Jonathan Alter, a senior editor at Newsweek is quoted by Meyrowitz as saying:
If we don't think that you have at least some chance of being elected, you just don't get any coverage. Perhaps it's not the way it should be, but that's the way it is.
p. 49
To find out who's likely to win you ask around. But whom do you ask? Well, of course, you sound out powerful and experienced politicians, news editors, captains of industry. I suppose you could say there wouldn't be a lot of point in asking losers for their opinions, so you naturally ask society's winners. In other words, you ask the 'insiders' to judge whether an 'outsider' like Agran stands a chance of winning. In an election when the polls consistently showed a high degree of voter dissatisfaction with the 'system' of big politics, the media's public and democracy generally would seem to be particularly poorly served by such a process. As Meyrowitz explains, when even the media are expressing that dissatisfaction with the big names in politics, 'public logic' dictates that the media should air the views of 'outsiders' to see if they resonate with the voters. What actually happened was quite different:The national journalists I spoke with seemed to see this sad state of affairs as a reason to protect the 'insiders' even more. Indeed, in some interviews, journalists expressed willingness to reject the significance of an 'outsider' candidate even if he won an election! Tom Rosenstiel told me: 'One of the problems that people in D.C. see in the presidential primary season is that anyone can run. There's a body of thought among insiders, including the media, that this is not necessarily a good thing.' He pointed to former president Jimmy Carter as an example of someone who was too much of an outsider to know how to govern the country effectively. He noted that there is a 'divisiveness' that comes from attacking and running against the 'institutions that run the country.' This view also seemed to underlie the hostility towards Jerry Brown that I heard among many national journalists - even as he was winning caucuses and primaries. So while the public was clearly demanding change, national journalists seemed closely aligned, perhaps more fiercely than ever, with the status quo.
pp. 53-54
- research which lends considerable support to Chomsky's 'propaganda model' of media operation.Any journalist's career is likely to depend on knowing the right people. The more highly placed the journalist's source, the more credible and influential her message is likely to be and the more kudos she is likely to earn amongst other journalists. Hence, it is important to a journalist's career that she should pay close attention to, and associate with, potential winners, at the same time making contacts which are likely to come in useful when the candidate has won, as well as perhaps leading to offers of employment as presidential adviser etc. Where TV journalists were concerned, the 'star' moderators did generally not wish to appear on camera with the 'outsider' candidates, who might lessen the status which they gain from moderating debates between the 'big guns'.
To a certain extent, local journalists' career motives led them to wish to cover the campaign. In their case, however, this tended to work in favour of a wider spread of coverage, since for them almost any association with a national event such as presidential primaries offered the possibility of enhancing their careers.
As time went on, it became ever harder to cover a candidate who had not been covered earlier in the campaign. Elizabeth Kolbert of the New York Times said that
It's very hard to change the narrative in midstream. Once the ball got rolling, it was very hard to cover him. The press would have to go back and explain who the guy was.
p. 54
The use of the term 'narrative' is interesting here as it reminds us that journalists write 'stories'. It is in the nature of stories that they have a structure, and that they make sense, which reminds us of a number of Galtung's and Ruge's news values, the most pertinent of which are:
Meyrowitz explains how even Agran's successes were used to maintain the 'narrative'. For example, when Agran passed Brown in the polls, 'public logic' would lead one to expect closer attention to his views and exposition of them in the media. On the contrary, 'national media logic' dictated that Agran's success should be reframed in such a way that it was presented, not as a sign of Agran's significance, but as an indication of Brown's marginality.
Some of the journalists interviewed by Meyrowitz described their gatekeeping rôle as a service to their readers. In principle, of course, that is a perfectly legitimate position. Very few of us would have the time to read reports on every aspect of a campaign, even if it were possible to fit them all into a newspaper, and even fewer of us would have the energy or will to do so, no doubt. It's interesting, though, that in 1992 this 'service' to the readership was not performed where the 'outsider' Ross Perot was concerned. Although not representing either of the two major parties, his candidacy received a great deal of media attention, whilst other third-party candidates received almost none and were excluded from nationally televised debates. The difference between Perot and them, Meyrowitz acidly comments, is that
Since billionaire Perot had the money to buy direct access to the public through the media, not covering him would make the public aware of the media as 'censors'.
p. 55
Meyrowitz's account is a particularly disturbing investigation of media agenda-setting. He reports that the members of the public he interviewed were outraged when they discovered that information had been concealed from them and that many of the local journalists were also annoyed, seeing it as a matter of professional ethics that all candidates should receive fair coverage; indeed, one commented that he saw local news reports as a matter of recording history and that failing to report on a candidate would be to write that candidate out of history. Many of the national journalists, however, simply considered Meyrowitz naïve for expecting them to give even-handed coverage. This gulf between the public's expectations and journalistic practice raises serious questions about the functioning of the mainstream media in a democratic society. As an example of what we might reasonably expect to be the rôle of the media, the 1949 Royal Commission's arguments for diversity of ownership may be taken as a reference point, stating as they do a desirable ideal for the media and a strong argument for media pluralism as the essential basis for achieving such a goal. However, as we have seen from Meyrowitz's research, there is in fact little pluralism. There may be newspapers competing for market share, there may be two major parties and various contenders in each, but, behind it all, we have the powerful talking to one another and deciding what their narrative shall be. Under such circumstances the presentation of the media as fourth estate, as the guardians of democracy is little short of a joke.
'A plausible but unproven idea' was McQuail's (1984) assessment of agenda-setting. I suppose it would be rash to draw any very firm conclusions about agenda-setting from the above examples, but one wonders just what would count as 'proof' for McQuail. At the very least the above seem strongly suggestive of an effect, with Meyrowitz's study the most disturbing of all.
How the media may set the order of a debate on current issues
A detailed discussion of factors affecting agenda setting
Excellent article on agenda-setting by Scott P. Robinson
Introduction to Mass Media Effects
Glossary of media studies terms
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